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SEX AND THE SCHOOL TEACHER
Michael Willemsen*
INTRODUCTION
The laws against victimless sex crimes are the product of
hypocrisy. That same hypocrisy which created the laws assures
that they will receive only infrequent and sporadic enforcement;
even-handed and effective enforcement would jail many in the
community and result in the speedy repeal of these laws. From
time to time, however, some unlucky person is arrested and prose-
cuted. Some of those arrested escape with a severe case of fright
and embarrassment. But if the victim is a teacher, the incident
is likely to result in his or her permanent expulsion from the teach-
ing profession.
This article will explore the conflict between the reality of
modern sexual practices and the California laws which govern
victimless sex crimes and revocation of teaching credentials. The
California Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile the conflict by
holding that commission of a sexual offense, absent separate
proof of unfitness to teach, cannot justify revocation of the right to
teach, will be examined. Finally, the problems of constitutional
dimension which remain for future resolution will be investigated.
THESIS: THE LAw
The California Penal Code makes criminal a substantial
number of victimless sexual acts. Among the acts proscribed are
seduction by promise of marriage,' adulterous cohabitation,2 big-
amy,' incest, 4 the "infamous crime against nature" 5-a euphemism
which refers to sodomy, not water pollution-anal copulation,6 and
* B.A., M.A. 1959, LL.B. 1962, Stanford University. The author is a
member of the California Bar and a research attorney on the staff of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 268 (West 1970). In a sense, the person seduced is
a victim, but the harm is so insubstantial that the law affords her no civil remedy
in California.
2. Id. § 269a.
3. Id. § 281.
4. Id. § 285.
5. Id. § 286.
6. Id. § 288a.
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lewd and indecent exposure.7 Several statutes prohibit various
aspects of the business of making and distributing obscene mat-
ter.8 Other statutes ban prostitution,9 and the keeping of a "dis-
orderly house"'I0-another euphemism which apparently refers to
an establishment which provides rooms for illicit sexual activity.
The punishments prescribed for violation of these provisions
are startling in their severity. The maximum punishment of life
imprisonment for a second conviction for indecent exposure was
recently held unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in
In re Lynch." Since imprisonment, unlike death or banish-
ment, is not deemed an intrinsically cruel or unusual punishment,12
the Lynch decision marks the first case in California striking down
a punishment for its sheer disproportionality to the gravity of the
offense." Equally Draconian is the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment for a first offense of sodomy.' 4 A maximum of
fifty years imprisonment for incest' and fifteen years for oral cop-
ulation between consenting adults, 16 is hardly less astonishing.
The misdemeanor statutes regulating disorderly conduct also
encompass some forms of victimless sexual activity. Penal Code
section 647, subdivision (a), 17 proscribes lewd or dissolute conduct
in "any public place, and place open to the public, or exposed to
public view"; subdivision (d)' s prohibits loitering in the vicinity
of a public toilet to engage in or solicit lewd conduct. Section
650.5," which prohibits "outraging public decency", has also
been applied to victimless sexual behavior, but that enactment was
held unconstitutional for vagueness.2"
Persons convicted of committing most victimless sex crimes
are, along with the perpetrators of sexual assaults, required by
7. Id. § 314.
8. Id. §§ 311, 311.2, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6 (West Supp. 1974).
9. id. §§ 266-67, 315, 318 (West 1970).
10. Id. § 316.
11. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
12. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 266 Cal. App. 2d 918, 927-29, 72 Cal. Rptr.
538, 544-45 (1968), which rejected the contention that an indeterminate prison
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
13. Id. at 420, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 286 (West 1970) provides a punishment of "not less
than one year." Under Penal Code section 671:
Whenever a person is declared punishable for a crime by imprison-
ment in the state prison for a term not less than any specific number of
years, and no limit to the duration of such imprisonment is declared,
punishment of such offender shall be imprisonment during his natural
life....
15. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 285 (West 1970).
16. Id. § 288a.
17. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West Supp. 1974).
18. Id. § 647(d).
19. Id. § 650.5 (West 1970).
20. In re Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966).
[Vol. 14
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Penal Code section 290 to register as sexual offenders. 2 1  The
purpose of this registration law presumably is to provide the
police with a ready list of suspects to interrogate whenever a rape
or molestation occurs. 22  But the law sweeps so broadly that this
purpose is submerged in absurdity. For example, it is conceivable
that actors and actresses in sexually explicit movies, whether their
role involves sexual activity or not, could be required to register.
The law's dragnet effect may also reach the cameraman, the di-
rector, the producer and, perhaps, anyone who invested in the
movie. In fact, it seems legally possible for a corporation to find
itself compelled to register, although such a "person" is not likely
to be a neighborhood molester.23
Penal Code section 291 places a special duty on the police
to notify a school district whenever a school employee is arrested
for a crime which would require registration.24  This unique stat-
ute-no other profession is so treated-suggests an extraordinary
21. CAL. PEN. CODE § 290 (West Supp. 1974) requires registration of any
person convicted of assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy, or
of any offense defined in Sections 266, 267, 268, 285, 286, 288, 288a,
subdivision 1 of section 647a, subdivision 2 or 3 of section 261, subdi-
vision (a) or (d) of section 647, or subdivision 1 or 2 of section 314,
or of any offense involving lewd and lascivious conduct under Section
272 ...
Section 290 also requires registration of persons who attempt to commit such
crimes, and registration of persons determined to be mentally disordered sex of-
fenders. Id.
22. The California Supreme Court in Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d
821, 825-26, 464 P.2d 483, 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (1970), said that:
The purpose of section 290 is to assure that persons convicted of
the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police sur-
veillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to com-
mit similar offenses in the future.
23. Subdivision 2 of section 314 of the Penal Code prohibits procuring any
person to expose himself. This statute has been applied to "bottomless" dancing,
People v. Newton, 9 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 24, 88 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1970). Arguably,
a corporation which employs a "bottomless" dancer violates subdivision 2 of sec-
tion 314, and must register under CAL. PEN. CODE section 290. Likewise, a cor-
poration which employed actors to commit sodomy or oral copulation might be
criminally liable as a principal, and be required to register under section 290.
24. CAL. PEN. CODE § 291 (West Supp. 1974) provides:
Every sheriff or chief of police, upon the arrest for any of the of-
fenses enumerated in Section 290 or in subdivision 1 of Section 261 of
any school employee, shall do either of the following:
(1) If such school employee is a teacher in any of the public
schools of this state, he shall immediately notify by telephone the super-
intendent of schools of the school district employing such teacher and
shall immediately give written notice of the arrest to the Commission
for Teacher Preparation and Licensing and to the superintendent of
schools in the county wherein such person is employed. Upon receipt
of such notice, the county superintendent of schools shall immediately
notify the governing board of the school district employing such person.
(2) If such school employee is a nonteacher in any of the public
schools of this state, he shall immediately notify by telephone the super-
intendent of schools of the school district employing such nonteacher
and shall immediately give written notice of the arrest to the governing
board of the school district employing such person.
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legislative concern with the danger that might arise solely from the
possibility that a teacher has at some time been guilty of sexual
misconduct. This legislative obsession becomes apparent by per-
suing the Education Code, which contains an array of overlapping
or duplicative statutes, designed to ensure that persons convicted
of sex crimes neither acquire nor hold any kind of teaching cre-
dential nor teach at any level.
First, Education Code section 12912 defines the term "sex
offense" to include rape, molestation, sodomy, oral copulation,
indecent exposure, and lewd conduct in a public place. 5 Con-
viction of any of these crimes requires: (1) denial of any ap-
plication for a teaching credential, 6 (2) revocation of any exist-
ing credential by the state27 and county board,2" and (3) immedi-
ate termination of employment.29 Section 13718.1 of the Educa-
tion Code requires that these measures be applied to school dis-
tricts with a merit system,'30 and section 129101 provides that
25. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12912 (West 1970) defines "sex offense" to include:
(a) Any offense defined in Sections 266, 267, 285, 286, 288, 288a,
647a, subdivision 3 or 4 of Section 261, or subdivision (a) or (d) of
Section 647 of the Penal Code.
(b) Any offense defined in former subdivision 5 of former Section
647 of the Penal Code repealed by Chapter 560 of the Statutes of 1961,
or any offense defined in former subdivision 2 of former Section 311
of the Penal Code repealed by Chapter 2147 of the Statutes of 1961 if
the offense defined in such sections was committed prior to September
15, 1961, to the same extent that such an offense committed prior to
such date was a sex offense for the purposes of this section prior to Sep-
tember 15, 1961.
(c) Any offense defined in Section 314 of the Penal Code commit-
ted on or after September 15, 1961.
(d) Any offense defined in former subdivision 1 of former Section
311 of the Penal Code repealed by Chapter 2147 of the Statutes of 1961
committed on or after September 7, 1955, and prior to September 15,
1961.
(e) Any offense involving lewd and lascivious conduct under Sec-
tion 272 of the Penal Code committed on or after September 15, 1961.
(f) Any offense involving lewd and lascivious conduct under
former Section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code repealed by
'Chapter 1616 of the Statutes of 1961 if such an offense was committed
prior to September 15, 1961, to the same extent that such an offense
committed prior to such date was a sex offense for the purposes of this
section prior to September 15, 1961.
(g) Any attempt to commit any of the above-mentioned offenses.
(h) Any offense committed or attempted in any other state which,
if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as
one or more of the above-mentioned offenses.
26. Id. § 13130 (West Supp. 1974).
27. Id. § 13207.
28. Id. § 13218 (West 1969).
29. Id. §§ 13409, 13586 (West Supp. 1974).
30. Id. § 13718.1 (West 1969). CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13596 (West 1969)
parenthetically defines the merit system as a civil service system. The system
provides for the appointment of people to positions not requiring certification
qualifications to be based on individual qualifications, competitive exams and
eligibility lists. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13581, 13723-13723.6.
31. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12910 (West Supp. 1974).
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nullification of a conviction pursuant to Penal Code section
1203.431 will not relieve the defendant teacher of these conse-
quences.8 3 Rather redundantly, section 13206 of the Education
Code 4 provides for revocation of the teaching credentials of per-
sons convicted of rape, molestation, sodomy and oral copulation,
although conviction of such crimes is already ground for revoca-
tion under section 13207 and 13218.11
All of these provisions, however, apply to cases in which the
teacher is convicted of a sex offense. 6 That ubiquitous institu-
tion, the plea bargain, assures that few will suffer conviction.
Instead, persons charged with sex crimes will often enter a guilty
plea to disturbing the peace, outraging public decency or other re-
lated offenses not listed as specific grounds for revocation in the
Education Code. Consequently, state and local school boards, in
actions to discharge or revoke credentials of teachers, frequently
must rely upon the statutory provisions which refer not to con-
victions but to the underlying conduct.
The most important of these provisions is Education Code
section 13202, which requires the State Board of Education to re-
voke or suspend a teaching credential "for immoral or unprofes-
sional conduct . . . or for evident unfitness for service." 7  The
32. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974).
33. Section 1203.4 of the Education Code provides that when a defendant has
fulfilled all conditions of probation, the court, in its discretion, may dismiss the
charges against the defendant, who "shall thereafter be released from all penalties
and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he has been convicted."
34. Section 13206 states that:
Upon the becoming final of the conviction of the holder of any cre-
dential issued by the State Board of Education or the Commission for
Teaching Preparation and Licensing of a violation, or attempted viola-
tion, of any one or more of Penal Code Sections 187 to 191, 192 insofar
as said section relates to voluntary manslaughter, 193, 194 to 232, both
inclusive, 244, 245, 261 to 267, both inclusive, 273a, 273f, 273g, 278,
285 to 288a, both inclusive insofar as said sections relate to felony con-
victions, 503 and 504, or of Penal Code Section 272, the commission
shall forthwith revoke the credential.
35. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13207, 13218 (West Supp. 1974).
36. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12911 (West Supp. 1974) provides:
A plea or verdict of guilty or a finding of guilt by a court in a
trial without a jury is deemed to be a conviction within the meaning
of Sections 13175, 13207, 13218, 13255, and 13586 of this code, irre-
spective of a subsequent order under the provisions of Section 1203.4
of the Penal Code allowing the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and
entering a plea of not guilty, or setting aside the verdict of guilty, or
dismissing the accusations or information. The record of such convic-
tion of a sex offense as defined in Section 12912 or of a narcotics
offense defined in Section 12912.5 shall be sufficient proof of convic-
tion of a crime involving moral turpitude for the purposes of Sections
13313, 13327 and 13338, and Sections 13403 to 13441, inclusive, of
this code, relating to the dismissal of permanent employees.
37. 1d. § 13202 provides:
The Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing shall revoke or
suspend for immoral or unprofessional conduct, or for persistent defiance
of, and refusal to obey, the laws regulating the duties of persons serving
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statute, however, does not define "immoral or unprofessional con-
duct" or "unfitness for service". Undaunted, the State Board of
Education has consistently proceeded upon the premise that un-
orthodox sexual conduct, whether criminal or not, constitutes "im-
moral conduct."
ANTITHESIS: THE FACTS
Most teachers are sexually mature adults; consequently, most
teachers must be sex criminals. A study of the incidence of victim-
less sex crimes will verify this assertion."
Oral intercourse, the most common of the sex crimes, is in-
creasing in popularity.39 Approximately sixty percent of all ma-
ture adults engage with some regularity in heterosexual oral copu-
lation.40 For married adults in the eighteen to thirty-five year
old age range estimates increase to eighty percent.4 College
graduates, a group which includes most teachers, are even more
likely than average adults to engage in oral copulation.4 Het-
erosexual anal intercourse is also on the increase. Kinsey found
this act so rare prior to 1948, that he recorded no statistical mea-
sure for it.43  But a current survey suggests that twenty-five per-
cent of married adults under 35 have engaged in heterosexual
sodomy.44
Statistics on homosexual oral and anal sex are less certain.
The Kinsey report stated that thirty-seven percent of males and
nineteen percent of females have engaged in at least one homo-
sexual act; that ten percent of males and two to six percent of fe-
males are predominantly homosexual. 45 The Kinsey reports do not
discuss the nature of the homosexual acts, but a later study as-
serts that ninety-nine percent of male homosexuals and ninety-
in the Public School System, or for any cause which would have war-
ranted the denial of an application for a credential or the renewal
thereof, or for evident unfitness for service.
38. The statistics cited in this section are based on the large scale studies di-
rected by Dr. Kinsey (A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEB-
HARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953), supplemented by a
recent study conducted by The Research Guild at the request of PLAYBOY MAGA-
ZINE, and summarized in M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HUNT].
39. HUNT, supra note 38, at 34-35.
40. Id. at 34, 198.
41. Id. at 199.
42. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MALE 370-71.
43. Id. at 392.
44. HUNT, supra note 38, at 36.
45. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MALE 623, 651 and A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 453, 473,
[Vol. 14
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eight percent of lesbians have engaged in oral-genital contact and
ninety-three percent of the males in anal intercourse.46  This same
report stated that one third of the male homosexuals, but only four
percent of the females, had been arrested for conduct related to
their sexual orientation." Most of these arrests involved either
solicitation or actual sexual conduct in a public place, both of
which are proscribed by Penal Code section 647, subdivision(a). 48
Premarital intercourse has become both acceptable and
widespread. 9 Extra-marital intercourse is also on the increase,
although less dramatically.50 Neither of these practices is neces-
sarily criminal in California, which proscribes only adulterous co-
habitation."'
One consequence of the increase in non-marital "amateur"
sex is the marked decline in the number of men who visit prosti-
tutes. The 1948 Kinsey report found that sixty-nine percent of
the adult males had visited prostitutes,"2 but a more recent sur-
vey shows that far fewer men currently do So.
3
Other consensual sex crimes are much rarer. Kinsey reported
that seventeen percent of rural males interviewed had had some
sexual experience with animals. 54 No figures are currently avail-
able on incest, which is probably rare, nor on bigamy, which is
rarer still.
By integrating this data, it becomes apparent that a majority
of adults presently engage in criminal sexual behavior. Kinsey
estimated that ninety-five percent of adult American men have
experienced orgasm in an illegal manner. 55 This percentage
figure, however, is not applicable to California since the figure
assumes that adultery without cohabitation is criminal. 6 Never-
theless, starting with an estimate that sixty percent of adult males
and females engage in heterosexual oral copulation, it may be as-
sumed that roughly seventy percent of the adult population have
committed either that act or some other victimless sex crime.
46. M. SAGH!R & E. ROnNS, MALE AND FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY 50-52, 220
(1973).
47. Id. at 165, 308.
48. Id. at 165-67.
49. See HUNT, supra note 38, at 142-55.
50. id. at 254.
51. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 269(a), 269(b) (West 1970).
52. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 597.
53. HUNT, supra note 38, at 144.
54: A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 362.
55. Id. at 392.
56. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 269(a), 269(b) (West 1970).
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There is no reason to believe that teachers are less prone to com-
mit such offenses than the average adult. To the contrary, adults
holding college degrees, a class which includes almost all teachers,
have been found to be more likely to engage in sexual experimen-
tation5" and, therefore, are more likely to have committed most
of the listed offenses than adults of lesser educational achieve-
ment.
THE Morrison SYNTHESIS
The problem now becomes clear: about seventy percent of
California's teachers commit criminal sexual acts which, if dis-
covered and prosecuted to conviction, would compel revocation of
their teaching credentials. Further, Education Code section
1320258 permits revocation for conduct which, although legal, is
"immoral". Many people believe adultery, with or without co-
habitation, to be immoral; some believe all non-marital fornica-
tion immoral; others believe the practice of any form of contra-
ception immoral. Depending upon whose definition of immoral-
ity one reads into section 13202, at least seventy percent of Cal-
ifornia's teachers face banishment from their profession.
Practicality now interrupts this statiscal exercise. Even if
the state could identify the immoral seventy percent, it could not
realistically contemplate such a mass credential revocation. The
consequence would be educational catastrophy. But how can the
state enforce its revocation statutes without producing disaster?
That same hypocrisy which leads persons to denounce and ban
acts which they themselves commit yields the answer: because
the police put relatively little effort into enforcing the laws against
victimless sex, few teachers are caught; the school boards and
courts then denounce the immorality of the few unfortunates who
are caught, yet ignore the fact that other teachers and most adults
in general-including perhaps a large number of policemen, dis-
trict attorneys and judges-commit similar acts.
The alternative to such hypocrisy is to construe the revoca-
tion laws to limit their reach to conduct bearing directly on fit-
ness to teach. By a 4-3 vote, the California Supreme Court in
Morrison v. State Board of Education59 selected this alternative.
The defendant in this case, Mark Morrison, had engaged in
a brief homosexual relationship with another teacher. The spe-
cific sexual acts involved-apparently several incidents of mutual
masturbation-violate no law when done in private, and Morri-
57. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
58. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13202 (West Supp. 1974).
59. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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son was neither charged with, nor convicted of, any crime. Pro-
ceeding, however, under the broad language of section 13202, the
State Board of Education found that Morrison's act constituted
"immoral conduct," "unprofessional conduct" and "moral turpi-
tude," necessitating revocation of his teaching credential.60 Mor-
rison appealed to the California Supreme Court, contending that
section 13202 was void for vagueness. Applying the principle
that a statute should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality,
the majority of the California Supreme Court limited the pro-
scription of section 13202 to "immoral or unprofessional conduct
or moral turpitude of the teacher which indicates unfitness to
teach."'" Restating this holding in stronger language, the ma-
jority opinion by Justice Tobriner indicated that an individual can
be removed from the teaching profession only upon a showing
that his retention in the profession "poses a significant danger of
harm to either students, school employees or others who might be
affected by his actions as a teacher."' 2 Presenting no testimony
relating Morrison's conduct to his fitness to teach, the Board ar-
gued that proof of private consensual homosexual activity in it-
self demonstrated unfitness to teach-an argument which implies
that homosexuals are per se unfit and should be excluded from
the teaching profession. The majority squarely rejected this ar-
gument. The court stated:
Before the Board can conclude that a teacher's continued re-
tention in the profession presents a significant danger of harm
to students or fellow teachers, essential factual premises in its
reasoning should be supported by evidence or official notice.
In this case, despite the quantity and quality of information
available about human sexual behavior, the record contains
no such evidence as to the significance and implications of
the . . . incident. Neither this court nor the superior court
is authorized to rectify this failure by uninformed speculation
or conjecture as to petitioner's future conduct.63
Concluding that no competent, credible evidence supported any
inference of Morrison's unfitness to teach, the court reversed
the judgment of the superior court.
Justices Sullivan, McComb and Burke dissented. The prin-
ciple dissent, authored by Justice Sullivan, relied upon Sarac v.
60. For an analysis of the arguments which have been raised to justify dis-
missal of teachers who engage in disapproved sexual conduct, see Comment, Un-
fitness to Teach: Credential Revocation & Dismissal For Sexual Conduct, 61 CAL.
L. REV. 1442 (1973).
61. 1 Cal. 3d at 225, 461 P.2d at 832, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (emphasis
added).
62. Id. at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
63. Id. at 237, 461 P.2d at 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
1974]
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Board of Education,64 an earlier appellate court decision which
upheld the revocation of the credential of a teacher convicted
of disorderly conduct following a homosexual encounter on a pub-
lic beach. Quoting Sarac,6 5 Justice Sullivan argued that homo-
sexual acts, whether or not illegal, were abhorrent to public policy
and justified revocation of a teaching credential. 6
THE FAILURE OF THE Morrison SYNTHESIS
Courts of last resort will sometimes render decisions which
offend the cherished values of some of the judges sitting on lower
courts. In such instances the justices of the high court, if they
wish their opinion actually to alter the outcome of future cases,
cannot simply file their opinion and depend upon stare decisis.
They must enforce their views. The school desegregation decis-
ion, Brown v. Board of Education,"7 is the clearest example.
Within a short time after that decision, some lower court judges,
strongly asserting their belief in segregation as a constitutional
and beneficent institution, decided that Brown did not apply to
segregation in non-educational matters, 6 or that Brown was itself
an unconstitutional attempt by a federal agency to interfere with
state school systems.69 Had the Supreme Court entrusted the en-
forcement of Brown v. Board of Education solely to the discretion
64. 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
65. In Sarac the court declared that
Homosexual behavior has long been contrary and abhorrent to the
social mores and moral standards of the people of California as it has
been since antiquity to those of many other peoples.
Id. at 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 72. I wonder how the Sarac court ascertained the "so-
cial mores of the people of California"? It is doubtful that the record in Sarac
contained evidence on this subject, yet in the absence of evidence such language
may represent only the personal views of the judges. Judges, however, are not
representative of the general population; women, racial minorities, aliens, the
young, persons without college education, and many other groups (such as homo-
sexuals) are underrepresented in the judiciary. A judge who assumes his moral
beliefs equal the social norms of California is on doubtful ground.
I predict that 50 years from now the language of Sarac will be treated as
a distasteful historical curiosity, the way California courts now treat the anti-Ori-
ental dicta of some nineteenth century opinions.
66. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 237, 461 P.2d 375, 397, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175, 197. The separate dissenting opinion of Justice Burke questioned
the majority's view on the standard of judicial review of administrative decisions,
a question which still troubles the courts but which is only tangential to the scope
of this article. See, e.g., Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 234 (1971) and Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement
Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, modified 11 Cal. 3d 312b, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805
(1974). Justice Burke dissented in both cases.
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. See, e.g., Handley v. City of Hope, Arkansas, 137 F. Supp. 442 (W.D.
Ark. 1956) (public swimming pools); Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co., 128 F. Supp. 469 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (public places).
69. Romero v. Weakley, 131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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of such lower court judges, inferior court decisions permitting segre-
gation might have remained the law and segregation would or
would not have continued according to the whims of the local judi-
ciary. But the Supreme Court, by a regular process of reversing
lower court decisions which defied the spirit underlying the Brown
precedent, 70 gradually made this landmark decision an effective
tool for reducing segregation.
The Morrison decision also challenged deeply-held religious
and moral views. Morrison, however, has not been judicially en-
forced. Two months after the decision was rendered, Chief Justice
Traynor retired and the philosophy expressed in Morrison no
longer represented the views of a majority of the Court. The
predictable result has been an unpredictable assortment of lower
court decisions; some judges have read Morrison broadly while
others have limited and distinguished its holding.7'
The critical problem in enforcing Morrison is the application
of that decision to cases in which a teacher's conduct has violated
some criminal statute. Although Morrison declared unequivocally
that "in determining whether discipline is authorized and reason-
able a criminal conviction has no talismanic significance, 72 the
majority opinion nevertheless noted that Morrison himself had
violated no law.78 Morrison disapproved Sarac v. State Board of
Education,7 4 but only to the extent that Sarac included "unneces-
sarily broad language suggesting that all homosexual conduct, even
though not shown to relate to fitness to teach, warrants discipli-
70. See R.L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv.
237, 238 (1968).
71. The first sign of trouble appeared in Alford v. Department of Educ., 13
Cal. App. 3d 884, 91 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1970). In support of its decision revoking
Alford's credential, the state board presented psychiatric testimony to show that,
by reason of mental illness, Alford was unfit to teach. The court of appeal cor-
rectly held that such evidence was sufficient under Morrison, to support revoca-
tion, but went on to give Morrison an extremely narrow and limited reading:
Morrison . . . seems to be a narrow decision, limited to its facts, and
one decided primarily upon a disinclination of the majority of the court
to permit judicial notice by the administrative agency or the trial court
of the possibility that a man who had engaged in the conduct of the peti-
tioner in that case might repeat it so as to render him unfit to teach.
13 Cal. App. 3d at 889, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 846. See discussion in Comment, The
Good Moral Character of California Administrative Agencies-A Study of the
Good Moral Character Requirement, 5 U.C.D.L. REv. 84, 99 (1972). It strikes
me as improbable that the majority in Morrison was primarily concerned with
the pedantic niceties of judicial notice. I suggest that the Morrison majority
was unwilling to permit judicial notice of the "fact" that isolated, or repeated,
homosexual acts renders one unfit to teach for the simple reason that the alleged
"fact" is probably untrue.
72. 1 Cal. 3d at 219 n.4, 461 P.2d at 378 n.4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178 n.4.
73. Id. at 238, 461 P.2d at 393, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
74. 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967); see text accompanying
notes 64-66 supra.
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nary action. '75  The holding of Sarac, that on the facts of the
case revocation was justified without direct evidence of unfitness
to teach, was not expressly disapproved.
In Amundsen v. State Board of Education,76 the court of ap-
peal decided that the result and not just the dicta in Sarac was in-
consistent with Morrison. Concluding that Sarac had been over-
ruled by implication, Amundsen held that the Board could not re-
voke the credentials of a teacher convicted of a crime based on a
homosexual encounter without evidence relating that act to fitness
to teach. 77  But because Amundsen was not a published opinion
and therefore carried no precedential value the issue arose again
in Moser v. State Board of Education.'
Moser was accused of soliciting an undercover police offi-
cer in a public restroom to commit a homosexual act and was
charged with a violation of Penal Code section 647. 79  Convic-
tion of this charge would have resulted in automatic revocation
of Moser's teaching credential. The prosecutor, however, re-
duced the charge to disturbing the peace, and Moser was con-
victed of the lesser offense. The State Board of Education initi-
ated revocation proceedings under section 13206 of the Educa-
tion Code,80 but in support of revocation the Board presented only
the testimony of the arresting officer. A psychiatrist testified that
Moser did not possess the psychological traits that would make
him unfit for teaching. Moser's personality, in fact, was such
that it would be unlikely for him to have conducted himself as
the police officer had described. Assuming that Moser did com-
mit the act charged, however, the psychiatrist concluded that the
incident was one not likely to be repeated.
Although Moser had committed an act involving unprofes-
sional and immoral conduct, the record did not establish that he
75. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 238, 461 P.2d 375, 393, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175, 193.
76. Amundsen v. State Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 37942 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist.,
Div. 5, Dec. 17, 1971).
77. Id.
78. 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1972).
79. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West Supp. 1974) proscribes solicitation to
engage in lewd conduct and section 647(d) makes it a misdemeanor to loiter in a
public toilet to solicit an unlawful act.
80. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13206 (West Supp. 1974) provides:
Upon the becoming final of the conviction of the holder of any
credential issued by the State Board of Education or the Commission for
Teacher Preparation and Licensing of a violation, or attempted violation,
of any one or more of Penal Code Sections 187 to 191, 192 insofar as
said section relates to voluntary manslaughter, 193, 194 to 232, both
-inclusive, 244, 245, 261 to 267, both inclusive, 273a, 273f, 273g, 278,
285 to 288a, both inclusive, 424, 425, 484 to 488, both inclusive, insofar
as said sections relate to felony convictions, 503 and 504, or of Penal
Code Section 272 the commission shall forthwith revoke the credential.
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was unfit to teach. The Board, however, without taking further
evidence, revoked Moser's teaching credential. 8
Moser's case raised essentially the same issue as that in
Morrison, namely, whether proof of a homosexual act, without
more, is sufficient to show unfitness to teach. But Moser's act,
unlike Morrison's, violated a penal statute. Citing the holding in
Sarac v. State Board of Education2 the court held that the Board
could infer unfitness from the crime itself without need of evidence
to show a direct relationship between the criminal act and Mo-
ser's conduct as a teacher.
8 1
While Moser was pending before the Court of Appeal for
the Second District, the First District was also considering two
cases involving the application of Morrison to teachers convicted
of possession of marijuana. In a combined opinion, entitled
Comings v. State Board of Education,8 4 the First District held that
conviction of a crime, absent other determinative faults, is in-
sufficient evidence of unfitness to teach. In the companion case,
Jones v. Jefferson Union High School District,85 the court upheld
a teacher's discharge from a tenured position, 6 relying upon the
opinion testimony of the vice-principal that the teacher's mari-
juana conviction resulted in unfavorable notoriety for the school.8 7
Despite this obvious conflict between the First and Second
District Courts of Appeal, the California Supreme Court denied
hearings in Moser, Comings, and Jones.88  The three remain-
ing members of the Morrison majority voted to grant a hearing
in Moser.89
81. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
82. 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
83. Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991-92, 101 Cal. Rptr.
86, 88 (1972).
84. 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972).
85. Id.
86. In evaluating fitness to teach, courts have employed the same standard
in cases involving termination of tenured employment by a local school district
as in revocation of a state credential. Comings v. State Bd. of Educ., 23 Cal.
App. 3d 94, 103-04, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73, 80 (1972); Board of Trustees v. Stubble-
field, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 826, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320 (1971). But a distinction
seems warranted. Revocation of a state credential should require a far stronger
showing of unfitness. Moreover, even if local notoriety impaired a teacher's abil-
ity to teach at his present locale, as in Jones v. Jefferson Union High School Dist.
(the companion case to Comings v. State Bd. of Educ.), such a teacher could
not reasonably be barred from obtaining a new job in a different community.
87. Most of the publicity in Jones v. Jefferson Union High School Dist. was
generated by the act of the school district in suspending Jones. Arguably the dis-
trict should be estopped to rest a finding of unfitness upon notoriety arising from
the district's own acts.
88. Hearings in Comings and Jones were denied on Mar. 30, 1972, and in
Moser on Apr. 12, 1972.
89. Those voting to grant the hearing were Justices Tobriner, Peters and
Mosk.
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Pettit v. State Board of Education:
WHICH-DISTINCTION MAKES THE DIFFERENCE?
Pettit v. State Board of Education,9" decided in 1973, is the
only case involving revocation of a teaching credential decided by
the California Supreme Court since Morrison.91 Pettit, a teacher
of mentally retarded elementary school children, attended a
"swingers' party" with her husband and engaged in oral copula-
tion with three men at the party. These acts were viewed by an
undercover police agent. 92 Pettit was charged with a violation of
Penal Code section 288a9" but pleaded guilty to the lesser offense
of outraging public decency,94 even though the statute proscribing
that offense had already been declared unconstitutional. 5 Since
the charge to which Pettit pleaded guilty is not among the specific
sex crimes enumerated in the Education Code96 as constituting
grounds for credential revocation, the Board brought revocation
proceedings under Education Code section 13202.17  Finding
Pettit unfit to teach, the Board revoked her teaching cre-
dential, and the California Supreme Court, by a five to two vote,
upheld the revocation." Justice Burke, writing the majority opin-
ion, distinguished Morrison on three grounds: first, Pettit's acts
of oral copulation were criminal; second, they had occurred in a
semi-public setting; and third, expert witnesses had testified that
90. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
91. Lindros v. Governing Bd. of the Torrance Unified School Dist., 9 Cal.3d 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1973), involved a refusal to reemploy
a probationary teacher; Board of Trustees v. Metzger, 8 Cal. 3d 206, 501 P.2d
1172, 104 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1972), concerned discharge of a permanent teacher.Both cases involved a teacher's use in the classroom of a literary work, authored
by the teacher, which contained an obscenity. In such cases there is no problem
showing that the teacher's act relates to his teaching and affects his students; is-
sues on appeal concerned whether the teacher's act "adversely" affected the stu-dents, whether it fell within the teacher's discretion-or perhaps his right of "aca-demic freedom"-in selection of course materials, and the scope of trial court re-
view of the findings of the school board. (For a similar case before the court of
appeal, see Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Olicker, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 102
Cal. Rptr. 421 (1972).)
92. 10 Cal. 3d at 31, 513 P.2d at 890, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 666. One may con-jure up an image of the agent standing fully clothed, clipboard in hand, taking
notes in the midst of an orgy.
93. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a (West 1970) provides, in relevant part:
Any person participating in the act of copulating the mouth of one per-
son with the sexual organ of another is punishable by imprisonment inthe state prison for not exceeding fifteen years, or by imprisonment in
the county jail not to exceed one year ....
94. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 650.5 (West 1970).
95. See In re Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966).
96. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 12912 (West Supp. 1974).
97. Id. § 13202 (West 1969).
98. 10 Cal. 3d at 36, 513 P.2d at 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 670. The two re-
maining members of the Morrison majority, Justices Tobriner and Mosk, dis-
sented.
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she was unfit to teach.9 9
From a realistic viewpoint, however, the Pettit decision can-
not be distinguished from Morrison on the basis of the factual dif-
ferences advanced by the majority. Rather, the change in judicial
attitudes is attributable to a change in the supreme court's personnel
to a majority whose members are uneasy with the attitude of
tolerance toward unconventional sexual behavior that underlies
Morrison, but are unwilling, in part through respect for principles
of stare decisis, to overrule that decision.
Turning to the first distinction advanced, Pettit's acts were
unquestionably criminal in that they violated Penal Code section
288a, which proscribes oral copulation;' 10 Morrison's homosexual
conduct violated no statute. But although Morrison himself en-
gaged in noncriminal conduct, ninety-nine percent of homosex-
uals-and a majority of heterosexuals-perform acts which are
proscribed by the criminal law.' 0' Thus, to limit the holding in
Morrison as directed solely to noncriminal sexual conduct in prac-
tical effect destroys the utility of that decision, and resurrects the
absurdity of labeling the majority of teachers immoral and unfit.
Pettit contended, moreover, that Penal Code section 288a
was unconstitutional and thus that her acts were not criminal.1
0 2
The majority refused to resolve that issue, asserting that the va-
lidity of section 288a was irrelevant to the question whether the
record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding that her conduct rendered her unfit to teach.108 The ma-
jority also failed to resolve the conflict between Moser and Comings
respecting whether a criminal conviction alone constitutes suffi-
cient evidence of unfitness. The logical inference to be drawn
from the court's refusal to resolve these issues is that the majority
believe that it is immaterial to the question of teaching fitness
whether the teacher's conduct violates a valid penal statute or re-
sults in a conviction. But under this reasoning, neither Pettit's
ostensibly criminal act nor her conviction can serve as a ground
for distinguishing Morrison.
The second distinction between Pettit and Morrison is that
Pettit's act, unlike Morrison's, occurred in a "semi-public atmo-
sphere.' 0 4  This phrase obscures the fact that Pettit's conduct
99. Id. at 34-35, 513 P.2d at 892-93, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 668-69 (1973).
100. See note 93 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
102. 10 Cal. 3d at 33 n.4, 513 P.2d at 892 n.4, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 668 n.4.
103. Id.
104. See Comment, Pettit v. State Board of Education--Out-of-Classroom
Sexual Misconduct As Grounds for Revocation of Teaching Credentials, 1973
UTAH L. REV. 797, 804-05.
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was neither public nor notorious. As the dissenting opinion points
out, her acts occurred in the bedroom of a private home, viewed
only by persons who expressly stated their willingness to view or
participate. 105  The record, moreover, shows that neither her
students, their parents, nor her fellow teachers were aware of
her conduct at the swingers' party. What "semi-public atmo-
sphere" apparently means is that Pettit engaged in sexual conduct
in the presence of willing viewers, a fact which the majority as-
serts is demonstrative of her lack of concern for privacy, decorum
and dignity.' 0 6
Yet the appropriateness of behavior is relative to its setting;
a display of concern for privacy, decorum and dignity at a swing-
ers' party would seem as inappropriate as levity and enthusiasm
at a funeral. In assuming that one can reason from specific be-
havior in one setting to a hypothetical psychological trait, and
from that trait to specific behavior in an entirely different setting,
the majority opinion employs psychological reasoning of question-
able validity. Such reasoning cannot be taken on faith, but must
be tested empirically. If Pettit in fact exhibited a lack of con-
cern for privacy, decorum and dignity in everything she did,
then it is likely she would have displayed such characteristics dur-
ing her thirteen years of classroom teaching. Yet, as I read the
majority opinion in Pettit, the school board is authorized to pursue
this reductio ad absurdum from hypothetical psychological traits
without seeking either expert or empirical verification. 107
105. 10 Cal. 3d at 41, 513 P.2d at 897, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
106. The majority stated:
Plaintiff's indiscretions involved three different "partners", were
witnessed by several strangers, and took place in the semi-public atmos-phere of a club party. Plaintiff's performance certainly reflected a to-tal lack of concern for privacy, decorum or preservation of her dignity
and reputation.
Id. at 35-36, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
107. The majority opinion states that Pettit's appearance on a television
show, where she and her husband discussed "non-conventional sexual life styles"
and "wife swapping," gave further indication that she lacked that minimum degree
of discretion and regard for propriety expected of a public school teacher. 10Cal. 3d at 35, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669. This language intrudesinto first amendment considerations. Unconventional sexual practices are matters
of public interest, and a discussion of such topics on a television panel show is
unquestionably protected by the first amendment. In Bekiaris v. State Board of
Educ., 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972), the California Su-preme Court stated that a teacher could not be dismissed for the exercise of
constitutional rights absent a showing that the restraints imposed on such rights
are justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 585-86, 493 P.2d at 485, 100
Cal. Rptr. at 21; see Board of Trustees v. Owen, 206 Cal. App. 2d 147, 23 Cal.Rptr. 710 (1962); cf. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966). The Pettit opinion demonstrated
no attempt to apply a compelling state interest test.
A similar first amendment issue was raised in Governing Bd. v. Brennan, 18Cal. App. 3d 396, 95 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1971). One Melkonian, charged with dis-
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The third distinction between this case and Morrision is that
the Board presented expert testimony that Pettit was unfit to teach.
Valid though this distinction might be, the expert testimony was
not convincing. Although the witnesses were qualified as experts
on fitness for teaching, they testified not as educators but as mor-
alists. Rather than examining Pettit's actual teaching perfor-
mance, each expert asserted his personal standards respecting sex-
ual morality and found that under such standards Pettit's conduct
was immoral.'08 To bridge the logical gap between off-duty im-
moral behavior and professional unfitness, both the witnesses and
the majority referred to the teacher's statutory duty to "endeavor
to impress upon the minds of the pupils the principles of
morality"'0 9 and to the legal dictum that a teacher must serve as
a moral exemplar for his pupils." 0
It is, however, by no means obvious that one who commits
an "immoral" act not involving teaching is unable to teach mor-
ality."' Each of us knows men and women who, despite their
private transgressions, preserve a proper and upright public im-
age. Indeed, the best qualified teacher of morality traditionally
has been the reformed sinner, St. Augustine being a particularly
noteworthy example. Secondly, this line of reasoning requires
a definition of morality. Without such a definition, there is no
way to determine whether Pettit's conduct was immoral, whether
such conduct in any way affects the teaching of moral principles,
tribution of marijuana, sought to challenge the constitutionality of penal legisla-
tion banning sale and possession of that drug, and solicited affidavits from per-
sons who had used marijuana to demonstrate that its long-term use was harmless.
Brennan, a teacher, filed an affidavit detailing her use of marijuana since 1949,
and was promptly fired. The court of appeal upheld her dismissal on the ground
that Brennan's affidavit did not merely advocate repeal of the marijuana laws, but
confessed to violating these laws, and that Brennan's example might lead students
to violate the law. See Comment, Good Moral Character of California Adminis-
trative Agencies-A Study of the Good Moral Character Requirement, 5 U.C.D.L.
REV. 86, 96-98 (1972).
Yet evidence of the long-term effects of use of marijuana is again a matter
of great public interest. Since that issue was before the court in the Brennan case
and Brennan was punished by loss of her employment for volunteering to appear
and testify in Melkonian's behalf on that issue, the Board's action arguably ap-
proaches the criminal offense of obstruction of justice. See CAL. PEN. CODE §
136 (West 1970).
108. Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 41-42, 513 P.2d 889, 898, 109
Cal. Rptr. 665, 674 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 36, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669, quoting CAL. Enuc.
CODE § 13556.5 (West 1969).
110. Id. at 36, 513 P.2d at 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 670, citing Board of Educ.
of the City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 552, 261 P.2d 261, 265
(1953); see Goldsmith v. Board of Educ. of Sacramento City High School Dist.,
66 Cal. App. 157, 168, 225 P. 783, 787 (1924).
111. See Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissal
for Sexual Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1442, 1458 (1973).
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or whether it affects her suitability as a moral exemplar.11 2
The experts who testified in Pettit presented their own idio-
syncratic definitions of morality, but surely those definitions are
not binding on the court. Indeed, obvious constitutional problems
would arise if the term "morality" as used in Education Code sec-
tion 13202 turned upon the personal views of the experts testify-
ing in each case. But a uniform and popularly acceptable defini-
tion of morality, if required, is a task to challenge a Socrates. The
majority does not attempt to formulate such a definition, but
their failure to do so leaves a logical fallacy in their analysis.
The net effect of the Pettit decision is to repose all power in
the trial courts. If the teacher's act is criminal, or if some edu-
cator or the court itself deems the act immoral, the conclusion is
sufficient to revoke a credential. By the same token, testimony
or judicial notice that an act was not immoral or did not relate
to unfitness for teaching would suffice to prevent revocation.
Since views on sexual morality range from a libertarian accept-
ance of all consensual acts to a Puritanical condemnation of ev-
erything except procreative intercourse between lawfully married
couples (and some would define "lawful marriage" to exclude
many marriages), an "expert" can be found to approve or de-
nounce a teacher's conduct in virtually all cases likely to come
before the courts. Thus, regardless of which way a trial court
decides the case, substantial evidence will appear to support the
decision. But a rule which has the practical effect of treating
the trial court's moral stance as if it were a question of fact, turn-
ing on the credibility of witnesses, will necessarily result in incon-
sistent decisions. Eventually, in order to resolve conflicts in lower
court adjudications arising from the different moral views of trialjudges, appellate courts will be forced to one of two alternatives-
either to follow Morrison, and thereby avoid the philosophical
problem of defining "morality" and "immorality" by insisting on
evidence directly bearing on teaching performance, or to reject
Morrison and confront the problem of defining these terms di-
rectly.
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
In the final analysis, many of the issues previously discussed
concermng revocation of teaching credentials may turn on points
of constitutional law. For example, revocation is often justified
by reference to the criminal character of the teacher's act. Yet,
the criminal statutes most often applicable, section 28611 (sod-
112. The Morrison definition of "morality" in terms of teaching fitness is in-
appropriate in this context. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
113. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 286 (West 1970).
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omy), section 288a"1 4 (oral copulation), and section 647115
(lewd conduct), are of questionable constitutionality.
Sections 286 and 288a prohibit sodomy and oral intercourse,
whether done in public or in private. Such broad proscriptions
would appear to bring the statutes into direct conflict with the con-
stitutional right of privacy recognized by the Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut,"6 which struck down a Connecticut stat-
ute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Courts and scholars
have debated the parameters of this penumbral right of privacy,
but for purposes of analyzing sections 286 and 288a the outer
limits of that right need not be explored. The arguments at-
tacking the constitutionality of those Penal Code sections fall
squarely within the language and reasoning of Griswold."1
7
(Griswolds concern that enforcement of the statute in question
would require searches within the marital bedroom" 8  applies
equally to sections 286 and 288a; the Court's attack upon the
overbreadth of an enactment which, although designed to enforce
sexual morality, authorizes intrusions into protected zones of pri-
vacy" 9 strikes implicitly at the California statutes.
120
The California courts of appeal have consistently upheld
Penal Code sections 286 and 288a against constitutional attack.
Most published decisions, however, involve acts which do not in-
volve the right of privacy. 121  The application of section 288a to
114. Id. § 288a.
115. Id. § 647.
116. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. Two federal courts have held statutes similar to sections 286 and 288a
unconstitutional, relying upon the right of privacy declared in Griswold. United
States v. Moses, 41 U.S.L.W. 2298 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972); Buchanan v. Batch-
elor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Texas 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 989
(1971).
118. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." 381 U.S. at 485-
86.
119. [lit is clear that the state interest in safe-guarding marital fidelity
can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not,
like the present one, sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond
the evil sought to be dealt with and intruding upon the privacy of all
married couples.
381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring opinion).
120. W. BARNErr, SEXUAL FREEDoM & THE CONSTrrTION (1973), presents the
arguments as to why the sodomy statute may be unconstitutional. Most of the
arguments presented apply equally to support an attack upon the statutory pro-
scription against oral copulation. See also Comment, Oral Copulation: A Constitu-
tional Curtain Must Be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 523 (1974).
121. See, e.g., People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1973)
(violation during a live sex show); People v. Roberts, 256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64
Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967) (violation of section 288a in a public restroom); People v.
Ragsdale, 177 Cal. App. 2d 676, 2 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960) (violation in San Quentin
prison). People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970), upheld
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private acts was challenged in Pettit, and the application of sec-
tions 286 and 288a to private actions was challenged subse-
quently in Slater v. Pitchess."2  In each case the court found it
unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issues. Thus, a definitive
decision of the constitutionality of these sections' proscription
against private sexual behavior must await a future case. 28
If these questionable penal statutes are held unconstitutional
in a private context, several arguments could be raised to suggest
their unconstitutionality as applied to public acts. First, it may
be argued that the statutes' proscription of private and public acts
is not severable. Since the overwhelming majority of proscribed
sexual acts occur in private, it is unlikely that the Legislature in-
tended these provisions to impose criminal sanctions only upon
public sexual activity. This conclusion is all the more reasonable
when we consider that public sexual misconduct is already covered
under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a).' 24 Second, it
may be argued that the right of privacy is a "fundamental con-
stitutional right" and that doctrines of "overbreadth" and "chilling
effect," usually invoked in a first amendment context, can be
raised to safeguard this fundamental right. Under this analysis,
sections 286 and 288a must be struck down in their entirety;
otherwise, their overbroad language will inhibit persons from en-
gaging in constitutionally protected acts. The language of Gris-
wold, quoted earlier,'25 strongly implies that the doctrine of over-
the constitutionality of sections 286 and 288a in a case involving incest between
the defendant and his minor daughter, acts which cannot claim the protection of
Griswold, even though conducted in private. One decision, People v. Parker, 33
Cal. App. 3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1973), upheld a conviction for oral copula-
tion in private between consenting adults, but the defendants were engaged in film-
ing a pornographic movie intended for public distribution.
122. Slater v. Pitchess was a declaratory relief action seeking a determination
that both sections 286 and 288a of the Penal Code were unconstitutional; the court
of appeal denied relief saying that the constitutional issues could be raised in de-
fense of a criminal prosecution. The opinion, originally published at 33 Cal. App.
3d 720 (1973), was ordered unpublished by the California Supreme Court pur-
suant to CAL. CIv. AND CRIM. COURT RULES, Rule 976(e) (West Supp. 1974).
123. Doubts respecting the power of the state to prohibit private adult consen-
sual sex have appeared in several judicial opinions. Justice Marshall, dissenting
in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10 (1972), stated: "I have serious
doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating any
sexual act between consenting adults." Justice Tobriner, dissenting in Crownover
v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 441, 509 P.2d 492, 522, V07 Cal. Rptr. 681, 706 (1973),
noted that the "assumption that the state has the power to ban consensual adult
behavior, harmful neither to participants nor bystanders, on the ground that some
nonparticipants deem that behavior immoral, is certainly open to dispute." In
Silva v. Municipal Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 742, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484(1974), Justice Sims, in his concurring opinion, expressly reserved the question
whether sexual conduct "when conducted in private between consenting adults
may properly be prohibited by the state."
124. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(a) (West Supp. 1974).
125. See note 119 supra.
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breadth does apply to protect the right of privacy. 126 Finally, if
the only interest of the state is to protect against acts which of-
fend bystanders when performed in public view, then the punish-
ment imposed by these sections is plainly excessive when compared
to the treatment of other acts of public lewdness as misdemeanors.
The remaining criminal statute which plays an important part
in revocation cases is Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a),
which prohibits solicitation to engage in "lewd or dissolute con-
duct In any public place. . . ." Although the statutory language
is ambiguous, court of appeal decisions have interpreted it to pro-
hibit solicitation in a public place to commit a lewd act in a pri-
vate place.127 Since no law bans the private commission of lewd
acts,' 28 the statute as construed may prohibit speech urging the
commission of lawful acts. Consequently, constitutional inquiry
into section 647, subdivision (a), must consider not only the vague-
ness of the statutory language but also the statutory restriction of
free speech. In a recent decision, Silva v. Municipal Court,'29
the court of appeal struggled with both issues but emerged the
loser.
Earlier cases defining "lewd and dissolute conduct" read like
a thesaurus: "lewd" equals "dissolute" equals "wanton" equals
"debauched" equals "lewd" and so forth. 13 0 The court of appeal
in Silva added another synonym-"obscene"-and noted that
numerous cases have held statutes proscribing obscenity not void
for vagueness. The judicial gloss which adds specificity to ob-
scenity statutes, however, does not speak to a case involving non-
communicative conduct; without an audience, there is no one to
arouse pruriently or redeem socially. Thus the court of appeal
126. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973), the Supreme Court warned against judicial creation of new substantive
constitutional rights. Under Justice Goldberg's view in Griswold the right of pri-
vacy is not a new judicial creation, but a natural right antedating the Constitution
which received implied recognition by the ninth amendment. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965). It is questionable whether the current
Supreme Court so views this right.
127. See, e.g., People v. Mesa, 265 Cal. App. 2d 746, 71 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1968); People v. Dudley, 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 955, 959, 58 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1967).
128. See Steinke v. Municipal Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 569, 573, 82 Cal. Rptr.
789 (1969).
129. 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974); see note 123 supra.
130. See, e.g., People v. Loignon, 160 Cal. App. 2d 412, 325 P.2d 541 (1958);
People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); People v.
Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951). People v. Bayside Land Co.,
48 Cal. App. 257, 191 P. 994 (1920) defined "lewdness" as "all . . . im-
moral or degenerate conduct or conversation between persons of opposite sexes."
Id. at 260, 191 P. at 995. It seems self-evident that a statute which prohibits
"degenerate . . . conversation" is plainly unconstitutional on grounds of vague-
ness and impairment of freedom of speech.
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reopened the thesaurus, and defined obscene conduct under section
647, subdivision (a), as
that sort of sexual conduct which is "grossly repugnant" and
"patently offensive" to "generally accepted notions of what
is appropriate" and decent according to statewide contem-
porary community standards. It will ordinarily include con-
duct found "disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable
[or] loathsome" under those standards. 13 1
Even with this list of twelve synonyms for "lewd," the stat-
ute remains so vague that it is impossible to determine whether
solicitation to commit the most common sexual acts is or is not
illegal. Is public solicitation to engage in private marital inter-
course unlawful? What about premarital intercourse, or adult-
ery? Do contemporary statewide standards consider oral copula-
tion a disgusting and abominable practice? Neither the statute
nor the court of appeal opinion provides any answers, and there
is no reason to believe that juries, instructed according to the
Silva test, would reach consistent verdicts.
Utilizing its definition of "lewd" as "obscene," the Silva court
grappled next with the free speech issue. Noting that the first
amendment does not protect obscene speech, the court asserted
that a solicitation to engage in obscene conduct must include a
description of the proposed conduct and is therefore beyond first
amendment protection."3 2
Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that a descrip-
tion of obscene conduct is itself obscene. This assumption is cer-
tainly wrong. As any reader of Masters and Johnson' 3 knows,
it is possible to describe sexual acts in such dull and clinical
prose as to lull anyone's prurient interest. 4 And Cole Porter fans
might add that graphic description is unnecessary to a solicita-
tion; in the right context, "Let's Do It" is sufficient.
The concurring opinion by Justice Sims in Silva suggests a
more limited, and far more precise, interpretation of section 647,
subdivision (a). Justice Sims proposes limiting that section to
solicitation to engage either in public conduct or in private con-
duct which is prohibited by a specific penal statute.'85 Since
solicitation to commit a crime cannot claim first amendment pro-
tection, this limited construction avoids the free speech problems
apparent in the majority opinion.
131. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
132. Id. at 737, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
133. W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966).134. The assertion that a description of obscene conduct is itself obscene would
attach the label of obscenity to numerous medical and legal works, including this
article.
135. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 742, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
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Turning to the provisions of the Education Code, it may be
recalled that three different but redundant provisions of the Code
require credential revocations for convictions under Penal Code
sections 286 and 288a.130 Section 13202 of the Education Code
requires revocation for convictions under Penal Code section 647,
subdivision (a). To the extent that the Penal Code provisions
are unconstitutional, the Education Code provisions are pro tanto
invalid. But even if the Penal Code provisions withstand at-
tack, I suggest that the Education Code sections making convic-
tion under the criminal statutes automatic grounds for revocation
may be unconstitutional. 87
The right to practice one's chosen profession is one of the
few unenumerated rights which the courts have consistently pro-
tected as an element of substantive due process.' 88 A crucial bul-
wark of this right is the principle that a person cannot be excluded
or ejected from a profession on grounds which bear no rational
relationship to the practice of that profession.' 89 Thus, a statute
which asserts that proof of fact "x" is automatic grounds for ex-
clusion from the teaching profession is constitutional only if fact
"x", in virtually all instances, implies unfitness to teach.
If no person can be expelled from a profession on grounds
unrelated to his individual fitness to practice that profession, the
Education Code provisions in question cannot be sustained merely
on the ground that many persons who commit the enumerated
crimes are unfit to teach. Instead, such statutes must be analyzed
as if they enacted a conclusive evidentiary presumption of un-
fitness.' 40  The presumption and the statute itself would be invalid
if that factual relationship "is not necessarily or universally true
in fact, and . . . the State has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination."''
136. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
137. The constitutionality of automatic revocation upon conviction of a sex of-
fense was upheld in Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1973), and Volgulkin v. State Bd. of Educ., 194 Cal. App. 2d 424,
15 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1961).
138. The right to continue to practice one's chosen trade or profession is a
fundamental right; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Bixby v.
Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144-45, 481 P.2d 242, 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244 (1971).
Likewise, such continuation in employment is an important ingredient in the civil
liberty of the citizen; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90; Endler v.
Schutzbank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 169 n.4, 436 P.2d 297, 302 n.4, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297,
302 n.4 (1968). This right is "the very essence of the personal freedom and op-
portunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure";
Truac v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
139. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508, 518-19
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
140. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
141. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). Accord, Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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When the United States Supreme Court struck down school
board regulations which required teachers to take compulsory ma-
ternity leave in the sixth month of pregnancy, 4 ' the Court treated
such regulations as implying a conclusive presumption that teach-
ers more than five months pregnant are not physically able to
perform their teaching duties. Observing that physical fitness is
an individual matter which varies from teacher to teacher, the
Court concluded that such a presumption was neither necessarily
nor universally true and that the regulation was thus unconstitu-
tional. 4 ' This same analysis can be applied to the Education
Code provisions here in question. It seems obvious from the
statistics set out earlier'44 that proof that a person violated sec-
tions 286, 288a, or 647 does not necessarily demonstrate unfitness
to teach. It is absurd to declare on the basis of extracurricular
sexual conduct that seventy to eighty percent of present teachers,
including many of unquestioned competence, are unfit for their
profession. Proof of a public violation would present a closer
case, but public performance is not an element of the offense un-
der sections 286 or 288a, nor under section 647 as judicially con-
strued. Moreover, the automatic revocation statutes provide for
no hearing for the teacher to explain that his acts occurred in
private.
Even for those crimes in which commission in a public place
or public view is an element of the offense, a conclusive presump-
tion of unfitness for teaching is improper. The common assump-
tion that persons who violate these sections are dangerous to chil-
dren is neither an a priori truth nor a proper subject of judicial
notice. If the matter were put to the test of statistical evidence
and expert opinion, I would predict that the evidence of a relation-
ship between such an offense and significant danger of harm to
the students is not sufficient to support a conclusive presump-
tion. 45  In other words, these statutes imply factual relation-
ships which are neither necessarily nor universally true and the
state has an alternative and less restrictive means-an adminis-
trative hearing at which expert and statistical evidence is pre-
sented on the issue-by which to make a determination of teach-
ing fitness. It therefore follows that these statutes are unconstitu-
tional.
Moreover, each of the Education Code provisions in ques-
142. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
143. Id. at 645-46.
144. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
145. See Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation and Dismissalfor Sexual Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (1973); Note, The Supreme
Court of California 1969-1970, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 63-64 (1971).
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tion 146 rest their presumptions not on the commission of one of the
enumerated offenses but upon conviction of the offense. Thus,
the teacher who in fact violated an enumerated section but
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge not included within the coverage
of the Education Code provisions has a right to a hearing and an
opportunity to convince the Board and a reviewing court that,
despite his commission of the offense, he is fit to teach. One who
is convicted of the enumerated crime has no such right. I do not
know what characteristics distinguish those who plead or are con-
victed of the enumerated offenses from those who bargain to plead
to lesser crimes, but I suspect the distinction turns on competency
of defense counsel, a factor which is hardly related to a client's
fitness to teach.
Finally, Education Code section 13202, the revocation stat-
ute at issue in Morrison, Pettit and the other cases discussed in
this article, remains vulnerable to constitutional attack. In per-
mitting revocation for immoral conduct without defining such con-
duct, this section is open to charges of vagueness. 147 Moreover,
if the pre-Morrison definition148 of immoral conduct is used, the
section erects a standard which bears no reasonable relation to
teaching fitness. The Morrison court avoided those arguments by
construing immoral conduct to mean unfitness to teach.149  But
if this construction is only given lip service while teaching cre-
dentials are revoked as a result of arbitrary moral judgments by
the State Board of Education, the constitutional issues avoided by
the Morrison court will reappear.
In this pluralistic society, no single creed of sexual morality
commands majority assent. Just as there are parents who teach
their children a Victorian code of morality, there are parents who
teach a libertarian or situational ethic; just as there are those who
teach abhorrence of homosexuality, there are those who teach ac-
ceptance and toleration. As a lawyer and parent, I object to laws
and decisions which declare that a teacher who does not exem-
plify Victorian morality in his private life and who does not in-
culcate such attitudes in his students is "immoral" and "unfit."
No majority, and certainly no minority, should be entitled to use
the public schools as an exclusive forum for teaching its moral
principles. Absent a "significant danger of harm to students"'
150
146. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12912, 13206 (West Supp. 1974).
147. See Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (1973), hold-
ing unconstitutionally vague an Oregon statute permitting dismissal of a teacher
for "immorality."
148. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
149. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
150. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 235, 461 P.2d 375, 391, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175, 191 (1969). See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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-and the decisions notwithstanding, the showing in Moser,151
Pettit,' 52 and most of the other cases is miles from that mark-
a teacher's private life is his or her private business.
151. Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86(1972); see text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
152. Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr.
665; see text accompanying notes 90-112 supra.
